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Abstract: This study evaluates how non-performing loans and different types of board 
turnover—which we link to performing directorship (natural turnover) and non-performing 
directorship (forced turnover)—impact the economic performance (ROA) of banks. The 
proposed model and hypotheses, based on the conformance and performance roles of boards, 
are tested on a rich sample that includes all banking firms operating in Costa Rica between 2000 
and 2012. The results indicate that the negative effect of non-performing loans on ROA is 
significantly greater in banks with non-performing directorship associated with high rates of 
unexpected changes in the board. The findings of this study highlight the importance of 
balancing financial and non-financial goals if superior governance and economic performance 
are the objectives pursued by organisations. 
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Financial firms have long used their non-performing loan (NPL) ratio as an indicator of 
performance (e.g., Barros, Managi, & Matousek, 2012; Epure & Lafuente, 2015; Goddard, 
Molyneux, & Wilson, 2001). The level of outstanding loans as a proportion of overall loans, 
considered as ‘non-performing’ once they have reached anywhere from three months overdue 
(Epure & Lafuente, 2015), is viewed as an indicator of the lending performance of a financial 
institution’s loan portfolio. This NPL ratio has been found to be negatively correlated with the 
economic performance of banks (Barros et al., 2012). As a result, many, if not most banking 
firms integrate low NPL ratios as part of their corporate performance goals (Van Hoose, 2010). 
The use of NPL ratios within corporate performance objectives, and consequently as a 
common management control instrument within the financial sector, has been found to have 
repercussions in the way banks formulate their lending policy (Shrieves & Dahl, 2003). Efforts 
to maintain low NPL ratios have led the boards and executive managements of many banks to 
favour low-risk lending policies (Acharya, Hasan, & Saunders, 2006; Zhang et al., 2016). 
However, financial economic theory says that a diverse portfolio generates greatest returns 
in the long-run (Acharya et al., 2006). The trade-off that financial institutions are making by 
adopting low NPL ratio objectives is that they are skewing their portfolios with low-risk-low-
interest lending and forgoing high-risk-high-interest opportunities (Goddard et al., 2001; 
Sapienza, 2002). 
This skewness may be a sub-optimal scenario, especially in a context requiring economic 
growth. Low-risk-low-interest lending policies are more compatible with economic perpetuation 
rather than growth. Such a conservative lending strategy is not associated with strong 
entrepreneurial development, churn or economic drive within an economy (Pascali, 2016). It is 
also unlikely to stimulate much growth in those economies most in need of improving their 
competitiveness (King & Levine, 1993; Burgees & Pande, 2005; Schumpeter, 1934). 
The resulting financial market failure for high-risk credit is often filled by publicly 
subsidised lending or guarantee schemes (Zang et al., 2016). These arrangements either lower 
the risk or subsidise the interest cost so that banks driven by their low NPL ratio objectives can, 
nonetheless, supply credit to more entrepreneurial and disruptive ventures (King & Levine, 
1993). However, building on Jensen and Meckling (1976) a sizable body of research has 
associated such policy with moral hazard (e.g., Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Zhang et al., 2016). 
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Public intervention is viewed as more desirable and less disruptive when aimed towards deposit 
insurance systems rather than the supply of credit (Allen et al., 2005, 2018). 
Non-performing loans are an unintended consequence of banks’ credit activity, but we 
argue that the potentially negative impact of these operations will dilute in the presence of a 
performing bank directorship that naturally aims for the optimum NPL ratios and promotes the 
primary roles of boards: conformance and performance (Garratt, 2010).  
In such a scenario, there would be no need to artificially pursue low NLP ratios by 
adopting NPL-related objectives. Instead, banks with a performing directorship—i.e., a board 
not exposed to unexpected (forced) turnovers that may affect its functioning—will arguably 
enjoy better management and control systems that will mitigate the negative relationship 
between NPL and performance (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992). 
The study presented in this paper therefore proposes and empirically tests whether 
performing boards—i.e., those reporting natural turnovers—are conducive to performance, and 
whether the negative effect of NPL ratios are more pronounced in banks afflicted with non-
performing directorships (NPD), in terms of forced turnovers within the board of directors. 
A performant board, that is free of turbulence and undesired churn, is argued to be more apt 
to confront the added complexities of guiding the organisation towards an optimal risk 
configuration—which tolerates and efficiently manages certain levels of non-performing 
loans—leading to maximum returns. Such a competent board can better balance the 
conformance versus performance dyad that represents the generic dimensions of organisational 
governance. 
The empirical application uses a rich dataset for all Costa Rican financial institutions 
operating in the industry between 2000 and 2012. The detailed data provided by the Costa Rican 
Central Bank includes financial figures as well as detailed organisational information related to 
changes in the board of directors. More concretely, data available allows us to measure the key 
financial-related variables used in this study, namely return on assets (ROA) measured as the 
net profit divided by total assets, and the rate of non-performing loans (NPL) defined as the 
loans past due 90 days divided by total loans. 
Additionally, our data permits us to distinguish different types of board turnovers based on 
the directors’ departure date. Turnover refers to the percentage of directors that left the position 
in the reference period. We use the data regarding the exact contract termination date to 
differentiate between natural turnover of board members (performing directorship, PD) and 
forced turnover (non-performing directorships, NPD).1
Instead of analysing the canonical relationship between NPL and economic performance 
(ROA), our analysis extends the existing literature on boards by evaluating how changes in the 
 
                                                 
1 Note that the boards of Costa Rican banks are fully independent, that is, the regulatory framework 
imposes that directors cannot vest executive roles in their bank or in any other bank. 
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board of directors affect performance, and how board turnover resulting from natural 
variations—which we link to performing directorship (PD)—and forced departures—that we 
link to non-performing directorship (NPD)—impact the performance of banks.  
Additionally, by studying the role of performing and non-performing directorship on 
performance in a specific industry (i.e., banking) and in a specific context (Costa Rica), our 
study contributes to the growing stock of empirical studies dealing with boards in emerging 
economies (e.g., Epure & Lafuente, 2015; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & 
Hanuman, 2012). 
 
2. Theoretical and hypotheses development 
From a legalistic theoretical standpoint, control is the predominant function of the board 
(Vance, 1978). Grounded on the Companies’ Act and common law, this view sees a board’s 
primary function as that of controlling and serving the corporation by regulating and monitoring 
(Chaganti, Mahajan, & Sharma, 1985). For effective control, Koontz (1967) proposed that 
directors should check on the company’s performance ideally before they occur. For successful 
control under this premise, it is perceived that deviations from plans must be ‘fixed’ before they 
happen. This view which puts ‘control before results’ has not found much empirical support 
(Bacon 1973; Epstein, 1986; Juran & Louden, 1966; Koontz, 1967; Louden, 1982). These 
studies indicate that directors are generally ineffective at thoroughly evaluating and controlling 
managers ex-ante. This is true for most industries, but less in the case of the banking sector. 
The potential impact of the lack of control over banks was evidenced by the repercussions 
of the financial crisis that propagated across most western economies after 2008 (Goldstein & 
Leitner, 2018). Consequently, most governments and industry associations recommended 
stricter controls over bank executives and their policies (Davis & Obasi, 2009; Zhang et al., 
2016). Over the decade that followed, compliance to controls became one of the main functions 
of boards of most banks (Ingley et al., 2017). 
Public intervention, however, has been viewed as more desirable and less disruptive when 
aimed towards deposit insurance systems rather than the supply of credit (Allen et al., 2005, 
2018). As such, public policy has generally chosen to impose constraints linked to deposit 
guarantee systems, leaving greater flexibility for bank to govern their own supply of credit 
(Allen et al., 2018). The conformance role of the directorships of banks has centred mostly on 
controls over internal governance and lending policies. 
Long before a legalistic view of the function of bank boards, many researchers had looked 
into the function of the board and its governance from an agency approach (Berle & Means, 
1932; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). The proponents of an agency theoretical stance 
mostly explain board governance through the divergence of interests between owners and 
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managers, where the board is meant to control and align the executive towards the interest of 
owners (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010; Rechner & Dalton, 1991). 
In contrast, the stewardship stance argues that the executives are generally motivated to act 
in the best interests of organisations and their owners. Stewardship theorists see the board’s role 
as one that must empower governance structures and mechanisms to maximise the benefits of a 
steward (Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994; Fox & Hamilton, 1994). Thus, in this view, directors 
should play a greater role in facilitating and empowering managers instead of monitoring and 
control. 
The performance focus of this view is common to the strategic choice theoretical approach, 
which stresses that the actions undertaken by directors are meant to help the firm adapt to its 
environment. The ability of the firm in adapting to its environment is argued as the main 
explanation of the organisational outcomes obtained by the firm (Karoui et al., 2017). 
Therefore, the role of the board of directors progresses from the mere compliance of legal tasks 
to those involved with strategy development that promotes performance (Kreiken, 1985). 
Much of the literature related to the board governance has come to either defend or contrast 
any part of the compliance-performance dyad. In an effort to better explain the function of the 
board of directors, Garratt (2010) proposed a framework model that suggests two main 
dimensions of a board’s role: ‘conformance’ and ‘performance’. 
Conformance involves compliance with legal and regulatory requirements and 
accountability to shareholders or other stakeholders, which is internally manifested through the 
oversight, monitoring imposition of adequate internal controls (Garratt, 2010). This 
conformance dimension matches quite closely with the agency theory perspective on 
governance (Adams et al., 2010). In contrast, the performance dimension is about driving the 
corporation forward to better achieve its goals (Garratt, 2010). This consists of policy 
formulation and strategic thinking meant to take the corporation forward. The performance 
dimension is comparable to the stewardship approach of corporate governance (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1994). This framework (depicted in Table 1) suggests that boards need to be concerned 
with both the conformance and the performance dimensions of corporate governance. 
 
----- Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
 
Most performance control indicators used by banks are financial in nature. A more accurate 
analysis should also include some non-financial indicators. As argued by Hilmer and Tricker 
(1990), the risks of corporate governance are over-emphasised when monitoring is excessively 
reliant on financial measures. In the case of the banking industry, the level of outstanding loans 
as a proportion of overall loans, which is commonly termed as non-performing loans ratio 
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(NPL), has become the dominant standard of lending performance of a financial institution’s 
loan portfolio (Epure & Lafuente, 2015). 
The boards of banks adopting a conformance stance use of NPL ratios within corporate 
performance objectives, and consequently as a common management control instrument that 
influences the way lending policy is executed (Shrieves & Dahl, 2003). The overuse of NPL 
ratios, as a dominant control indicator, may lead to greater short-term-sightedness on the part of 
the board. When NPL controls become the norm, the board can easily lose sight of other, 
longer-terms aspects. Although prior work shows that non-performing credit portfolio is an 
important predictor of the performance and efficiency levels of banks (e.g., Banker, Chang, & 
Lee, 2010; Barros et al., 2012; Epure & Lafuente, 2015), we argue that balancing financial and 
non-financial performance indicators is vital for the successful governance of banks and, 
subsequently, their performance level in the long run. 
The strategic and performance driving functions of the board are much more difficult for 
the board to effectively carry-out. This is mostly due to the qualitative and future oriented 
character of the performance enhancing role of the board (Bustinza et al., 2018). Because of the 
many unknowns related with directing for the future, the complexity of the board’s performance 
role requires effective directorship and a competent board (Derban, Binner, & Mullineux, 2005). 
Building on the premises of the friendly board approach (Adams & Ferreira, 2007), only a 
competent board could effectively install a climate of confidence and open information between 
the executive and directorship of organisations, which allows boards to better balance the 
conformance-performance dimensions of governance. A performing directorship can therefore 
better gauge the compliance dials imposed on the executive in order to better reach optimal 
performance, even in the face of complexity. 
A board that is less competent or is dysfunctional due to internal struggles and conflict will 
most often turn away from its longer-term obligations towards optimal performance in order to 
centre its attention on the short-term controls systems that are simpler to monitor (Prowse, 
1995). In such a context, those boards of banks afflicted with a dysfunctional or non-performing 
directorship (NPD) may be less capable of confronting the complexities of a performance 
orientation. Such a non-performing directorship may therefore be less capable of driving bank 
performance in the presence of greater NPL ratios. Positive NPL ratios may be more detrimental 
to banks afflicted with higher NPD levels. Based on this theory and evidence, we therefore 
hypothesise that: 
 
H1: Non-performing loan ratios are negatively associated with economic performance (ROA). 
H2: The negative relationship between non-performing loans (NPL) and performance (ROA) is 
stronger among banks whose boards are more afflicted with greater non-performing directorship 




3. Data and Method 
3.1 The Costa Rican banking industry 
Similar to other developing economies, the Costa Rican government promoted the 
deregulation of the banking industry seeking to improve monitoring activities as well as to 
enhance competitiveness (IMF, 2013; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007). The Costa Rican banking 
industry has gone through various reforms including, among others, the creation in 1995 of an 
independent supervisory agent linked to the Costa Rican Central Bank (Superintendent of 
Financial Entities, SUGEF). The function of this agency is to improve the transparency of 
financial firms. Another significant reform was the introduction of the CAMELS rating 
framework in 2001 to further enhance the monitoring of financial firms’ activities (IMF, 2003; 
SUGEF, 2000). A detailed description of the deregulation process of the Costa Rican banking 
industry is presented in Lafuente and García-Cestona (2007) and Epure and Lafuente (2015). 
The SUGEF monitors all types of financial firms in the market, including: state-owned 
commercial banks, private banks, mutual banks, cooperative banks, financial conglomerates, 
financial (non-banking) firms, credit unions and currency exchange offices. Nevertheless, for 
enhanced accuracy and robustness of the analysis, in this paper we focus on those banks that 
operate under the same market conditions, in terms of regulation: the state-owned commercial 
banks, private banks, mutual banks and cooperative banks. 
There are various characteristics of the Costa Rican banking industry that are worth 
mentioning. First, the four types of financial firms analysed in this study operate under the same 
regulatory regime. Financial laws have also introduced transparency mechanisms that facilitate 
the access to detailed information on financial operations and organisational architecture. 
Second, regulation restricts the composition of the board of directors, and all board members 
have to be outsiders; that is, directors cannot hold any position in the financial firm (CEO, top 
management team, middle managers, or any other position) (Epure & Lafuente, 2015). 
Third, in a related manner, from the analysis of the financial law we can obtain relevant 
information about board composition of Costa Rican banks2
                                                 
2 The Ley del Sistema Bancario Nacional 1644 of 1953 regulates the board composition of state-owned 
banks (articles 20th to 37th) and privately-owned banks (articles 144th to 149th). For mutual banks, board 
composition is regulated in articles 76th to 82nd of the Ley del Sistema Financiero Nacional de la 
Vivienda 7052 of 1986. The board composition of cooperative banks is regulated in the articles 46th, 51st, 
52nd, 54th and 55th of the Ley de Asociaciones Cooperativas 4179 of 1968. 
. More concretely, state-owned 
banks are fully controlled by the Costa Rican government; however, and according to the law, 
they are considered independent firms since politicians cannot influence their managerial 
decisions. Despite their managerial independence from the Central Government, the financial 
law tells us that boards must have seven members designated by the Council of Ministers for 
periods different from the Government’s term of office. Although these characteristics lead us to 
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suspect that state-owned banks are governed by boards that may serve political interests (e.g., 
fund specific industries or stimulate the development of depressed areas), state-owned banks—
just like the rest of players in the industry—have to meet all the requirements of the regulatory 
framework (CAMELS) imposed by the supervisory agency (SUGEF). Thus, the pursuit of 
alternative goals is not necessarily connected to decisions related to changes in the board in a 
direct way, and this behaviour would only translate in potentially lower economic results 
(Lafuente et al., 2018). 
Concerning the board of private-owned banks, the law indicates that each bank determines 
the number of board members, being the only legal requirement that the board must have more 
than five directors. Also note that eight out of the 11 private commercial banks operating in 
Costa Rica in 2012 are registered in the Costa Rica’s stock market; however, the eight banks 
trade bonds and other securities while only two private banks trade stocks (for details visit: 
https://www.bolsacr.com/inversionistas/emisores-que-cotizan-en-bnv). 
Finally, the regulatory regime establishes some legal considerations for the mutual banks 
and cooperative banks. For mutual banks, their board should have between five and seven non-
executive members, and directors must be mutual partners. For cooperative banks, board size is 
restricted to be an odd number over five members, and board seats are not exclusive for 
cooperative partners. Similar to the case of state-owned and privately-owned banks, directors of 
mutual banks and cooperative banks cannot hold a position in any other financial firm. 
In conclusion, the Costa Rican financial legislation promotes greater transparency, as well 
as the separation of decision rights by imposing both the nomination of fully outside boards and 
a two-tier leadership structure among financial firms. 
 
3.2 The sample 
The data used in this study comes from the publicly available datasets of the Costa Rican 
Central Bank, and includes detailed accounting and organisational information for all financial 
firms in the industry during the period 2000-2012. Additionally, from our detailed database it is 
possible to identify—for each director serving in the board of directors of the sampled banks—
relevant information related to the contract initiation date and contract expiration date which is 
used to measure board turnover rates (details are presented in Section 3.3). 
As a result of a limited number of business entries and exits reported during the period 
under analysis, the total number of financial institutions in Costa Rica changed from 47 in 2000 
to 41 in 2012. Therefore, the study employs an unbalanced panel that includes information for 
all state-owned, private, mutual and cooperative banks that operate in the industry. The final 
sample includes information for 547 firm-year observations. 
At this point, as indicated above in Section 3.1, state-owned banks are fully controlled by 
the Costa Rican government; however, and according to the regulatory framework, they are 
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considered independent firms since politicians cannot influence their managerial decisions. In 
terms of market share, this group controlled 54 % of the deposits in 2012. The second group 
includes private commercial banks. In 2012, this group attracted 29 % of the deposits. The third 
group is formed by the mutual banks, which in 2012 had 7% of the deposits. Note that, similarly 
to the state-owned banks, the deposits of mutual banks are guaranteed by the government. The 
last group consists of cooperative banks. Although these financial firms are owned by their 
cooperative members, they offer financial services to any type of customer. In 2012 these firms 
accounted for 10% of the deposits. 
 
3.3 Variable definition 
Performance. In line with prior work on bank performance (e.g., Banker et al., 2010; Hsiao 
et al., 2010), this study employs an accounting metric to capture the performance of financial 
firms. More concretely, the rate of return on assets (ROA)—defined as the ratio of net profit 
divided by total assets—is used to measure the economic performance of financial institutions. 
Non-performing loans (NPL). In this study, we employ the ratio of non-performing loans 
(NPL) as a measure of credit risk. This variable (NPL) is expressed as the non-performing loans 
divided by total loans. Note that, following the regulation set by the SUGEF (SUGEF, 2000), 
non-performing loans are credit operations—i.e., mortgages, commercial loans or corporate 
loans—past due for at least 90 days. This variable has been used in prior research on bank 
performance (e.g., Banker et al., 2010; Barros et al., 2012; Epure & Lafuente, 2015; Zhang et 
al., 2016). Descriptive statistics for the study variables are presented in Table 2. 
 
----- Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
 
Board turnover. Concerning changes in the board of directors, we consider the exit rate 
from the board between two consecutive years (t-1 and t). By comparing the names and the 
contract terms (contract initiation and expiration dates) of board members available from our 
database, board turnover refers to the percentage of directors of a given board that left the 
position between two adjacent years during the study period. At this point, two important 
considerations are in order. First, note that we are interested in clearly identifying and 
distinguishing those board replacements that are expected to impact performance in the 
following period from those that are not because of time considerations. Consequently, and 
similar to the practice in prior corporate governance work (see, e.g., Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 
2001; Lafuente & García-Cestona, 2016), we consider that a change in the board corresponds to 
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a specific period only if this governance intervention took place between the last semester in 
year t-1 and the first semester in period t.3
The study employs panel data techniques to estimate the model that emphasises that bank 
performance (ROA) is affected by non-performing loans (NPL) and by different types of board 
 
Second, and considering that only non-executive directors can sit on the board (Section 
3.1), we consider the variation rate in the board for those cases when the turnover was normal 
and forced separately. Therefore, to accurately estimate the specific effect of predicted 
(voluntary) and unpredicted (non-voluntary) changes in the board, we split the rate of board 
turnover in two groups based on the contract information available from our database: 1) normal 
changes (performing directorship, PD) that include expected changes in the board due to the end 
of the contract period (i.e., contract expiration), and 2) forced dismissals (non-performing 
directorship, NPD) that encompass unexpected changes in the board taking place before the 
contract expiration (i.e., contract termination). A turbulent and churning board is argued to be ill 
adapted to confront the added complexities of guiding the organisation towards an optimal risk 
configuration—which tolerates and efficiently manages certain levels of non-performing 
loans— that could lead to maximum returns. 
Control variables. All model specifications control for bank size, board size, capital 
adequacy and time. Bank size is measured as total assets, expressed in millions of 2012 constant 
Costa Rican colones. Board size is defined as the total number of directors. Note that, in all 
regression models, the variables ‘bank size’ and ‘board size’ are logged to reduce skewness.  
In the context of the Costa Rican banking industry, the capital requirement is a relevant 
component of the monitoring scheme applied by the supervisory agency (SUGEF, 2000) after 
the regulatory changes introduced in 2000 (see Section 3.1). Capital adequacy—often proxied 
by relating equity and reserves to assets—is a regulation-led measure of the capitalisation level 
of banks as well as of the quality of credit-risk management practices which, in turn, may yield 
to superior operational flexibility by reducing uncertainty and potential credit losses (e.g., 
Banker et al., 2010; Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2004; Epure & Lafuente, 2015). Therefore, we 
account for the potential effect of capital requirements on performance by introducing the 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which is computed as equity plus risk-weighted reserves divided 
by total assets. Finally, a set of time dummy variables is included to rule out the potential effect 
of time trends and changes in the economic conditions among the sample financial firms during 
the analysed period (Vaillant, Lafuente & Bayon, 2018). Note that, in all regression models, all 
time varying variables are lagged one period to control for potential endogeneity problems. 
 
3.4 Method 
                                                 
3 We also tested alternative definitions based on quarterly periods. Results, not shown due to lack of space 
but available on request from the authors, remain unchanged. 
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turnover, namely normal (performing directorship, PD) and forced (non-performing 
directorship, PD) turnovers. Pooling repeated observations on the same unit of analysis violates 
the assumption of independence of observations, resulting in autocorrelation in the residuals. 
First-order autocorrelation occurs when the disturbances in one period are correlated with those 
in the previous period, resulting in incorrect variance estimates, rendering ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates inefficient and biased (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, coefficients are 
estimated via fixed-effects panel data models with robust standard errors to correct for 
autocorrelation of disturbances due to constant firm-specific effects (Greene, 2003). 
Based on the theory that underpins this study, the full model estimated by fixed-effects 
method that emphasises a relationship between economic performance (ROA), NPL and the 
different types of board turnover (PD or NPD) has the following form: 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 1
13 1 4 1 5
ROA NPL PD NPD NPL PD
          NPL NPD Control variables Time
it it it it it
it it t i it
    
    
   
 
     
         (1) 
 
In equation (1) j  are parameter estimates for the jth independent variable,   is the time-
invariant bank-specific effect that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across financial firms 
(i) and that is uncorrelated with parameter estimates; and   is the normally distributed error 
term that varies cross-observations and cross-time (t). 
In terms of our hypotheses, a result of 1 0   for the NPL variable (equation (1)) will 
corroborate that low levels of NPL are associated with higher ROA levels (H1). Also, the 
second hypothesis (H2) that states that financial institutions with higher rates of NPL and 
greater non-performing directorship (NPD) show lower performance levels will be confirmed if 
13 0   (equation (1)). 
 
4. Results 
This section presents the empirical results. Model 1 in Table 3 evaluates the specific effect 
of NPL and board turnover, while model 2 introduces an interaction term between NPL and 
board turnover into the analysis. Model 3 considers the effect of performing (PD) and non-
performing (NPD) directorship. Finally, model 4 analyses the joint effect of PD, NPD and NPL. 
Note that for the four models we computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all 
variables in order to test if coefficients are amplified due to correlations across the explanatory 
variables (collinearity). Table 3 reports the average VIF values as well as the minimum and 
maximum VIFs. The results for this test indicate that the average VIFs range between 1.67 
(model 3) and 2.06 (model 4). In all models, the mean and the maximum VIF values are below 
the commonly used threshold point of 10, which confirms that the model specifications 
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proposed in this study are not contaminated by collinearity. Also, from the correlation matrix 
presented in Table A1 of the Appendix we note that correlations mostly fall into the low-mid 
range, and that the highest correlations are found between the board turnover variables—which 
justifies our approach to analyse board turnover (model 2) and the type of turnover (model 3) in 
separate models—and between capital adequacy, ROA and total assets (size). 
The four regression models were processed in order to test the formulated hypotheses that 
in turn are meant to answer the set research question of whether the negative effect of NPL on 
performance is more pronounced in banks afflicted with non-performing directorships (NPD). 
To these models, a series of variables were included that control for bank size (ln total 
assets), the capital adequacy ratio ([equity + risk weighted reserves] / total assets), and board 
size defined as the log of the number of directors. These are all variables that may influence the 
correlations of our regressions and have therefore been included in order to make sure that the 
reported impact of the models’ main independent variables is robust to the presence of these 
controls. The results for the control variables are consistent throughout the four specifications of 
our models and therefore are not suspected to bias our main results. From these control 
variables, we can confirm that, as is commonly found in the related literature (Barth et al., 2004; 
Bin, 2005; Epure & Lafuente, 2015; Moyer, 1990), the capital adequacy ratio is found to have a 
significant positive impact on the ROA levels of banks. Neither bank size nor board size were 
found to impact subsequent ROA. 
The first specification of the model presented in Table 3 is the baseline model that includes 
the NPL ratio and proportion of board turnover as its main independent variables together with 
the mentioned control variables. The results of this base model (model 1 in Table 3) reflect 
those found in much of the literature where non-performing loans negatively affect banks’ 
ROA, that is, NPL destroy value (e.g., Epure & Lafuente, 2015; Van Hoose, 2010). This result 
is consistent with our first hypothesis (H1) that proposes a negative relationship between NPL 
and performance (ROA). 
However, when we interact the effects of the NPL ratio with board turnover, we observe 
that board turnover positively impacts ROA, but performance declines are predicted for banking 
firms with high levels of NPL and high board turnover rates (model 2 in Table 3). We tested if 
the coefficient linked to NPL is significantly different than the parameter linked to the 
interaction between NPL and board turnover, and the result of the F-test presented in Table 4 
(F-test = 4.05 and p-value = 0.0494) corroborates our arguments. That is, the entire negative 
impact of NPL is concentrated among those banks at the intersection of increased NPL ratios 
and greater proportions of board turnover, whereas board turnover—a natural process in any 
organisation (Adams et al., 2010)—is beneficial to performance. 
 




Having corroborated that the economic losses that follow high rates of NPL are more 
severe in financial firms that replace a high number of directors, models 3 and 4 deal with the 
specific role of the two types of directorships analysed in this study—i.e., natural (performing 
directorship) and forced (non-performing directorship)—in this relationship. 
The third model in Table 3 is a repetition of the base-model, but where the nature of the 
board turnover has been specified in order to distinguish natural from forced replacements. In 
this specification of our base model we find that the type of board turnover that positively 
contributes to bank ROA levels is natural turnover only (performing directorship, PD). Forced 
board turnover is not found to have any significant impact over the model’s dependent variable. 
The results of the full specification are found in the fourth model of Table 3 where the NPL 
ratio is interacted with that of both forms of board turnover; natural (PD) and forced (NPD).  
To aid in the interpretation of the results, we plot the interaction terms between the NPL 
ratio and the types of directorship variables (PD and NPD) based on estimates from model 4 
(equation (1)). The results are presented in Figures 1 and 2. In the figures, the vertical axis is the 
estimated level of economic performance (ROA), and the horizontal axis indicates the level of 
performing directorship (PD) (Figure 1) and the level of non-performing directorship (NPD) 
(Figure 2). The joint effect of NPL and directorship (PD and NPD) is presented for three 
different levels of NPL (0%, 1.5% and 3%). Control variables are set at their sample means. 
In the case of the rate of natural board turnovers—that we link to performing directorship 
(PD)—the significant positive impact of this variable on subsequent ROA is maintained. 
However, the interaction between PD and the NPL ratio is not found to have any significant 
impact on the economic performance of banks. As it can be seen in Figure 1, these results 
indicate that natural board turnovers are conducive to performance and that this effect is not 
conditional on the level of NPL reported by banks. The result of the F-test (Table 4: F-test value 
= 1.41 and p-value = 0.2410) confirms that the coefficient for PD (natural board turnover) and 
the parameter for the interaction between PD and NPL are not significantly different, which in 
terms of the findings in Figure 1 means that the changes in the slope reported for the effect of 
PD on ROA at different levels of NPL are not significantly different. 
On contrary, the result for the interaction between NPL and NPD reveal that the negative 
impact over banks’ ROA of NPL is concentrated at the intersection between increased non-
performing loans and greater proportions of non-performing directorship, represented by forced 
board turnover. In this case, the parameter for NPD is significantly different than the interaction 
term between NPD and NPL (Table 4: F-test = 2.71 and p-value = 0.0927). That is, the changes 
in the slopes reported in Figure 2 are statistically significant. These results highlight the 
importance of balancing financial and non-financial objectives for enhanced governance and 
performance among the sampled banks. The negative relationship between NPL and future 
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ROA becomes stronger for those financial firms demonstrating non-performing directorship 
(model 4 in Table 3 and Figure 2). This result gives support to our hypothesis H2 that states that 
the negative relationship between NPL and ROA is stronger among banks demonstrating high 
levels of non-performing directorship. 
 
----- Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here ----- 
 
5. Discussion  
The study presented in this paper aimed to verify whether the currently prominent policy 
among banking institutions of doing all it takes to maintain to a minimum the non-performing 
loans ratio is truly in the best interest of bank economic performance, in terms of ROA. Because 
financial institutions must forego high-risk-high-interest opportunities by adopting low NPL 
ratio objectives, low-risk-low-interest lending can represent a sub-optimal scenario, especially 
in a macroeconomic context requiring growth and stimuli (Kleinow et al., 2017). It was argued 
that the complexities of operating at an optimum loan ratio which requires accepting a certain 
level of non-performing loans requires a strong corporate governance represented by a 
competent board. The study therefore proposed and empirically tested whether the potential 
negative effect of NPL on ROA is stronger in banks afflicted with non-performing directorships 
(NPD)—in terms of forced turnovers within the board of directors—that arguably affect the 
monitoring and advisory roles of boards. 
Building on the theoretical framework proposed by Garratt (2010) in which conformance 
and performance are separate governance roles of the board of directors, we tested the proposed 
model on a sample of the Costa Rican baking industry during 2000-2012. The findings 
corroborate the importance of balancing financial and non-financial goals for enhanced 
economic and governance performance. In this sense, we found that the economic losses that 
follow high rates of NPL are more pronounced among financial firms demonstrating high levels 
of non-performing directorship which we link to forced board turnover. 
In coherence with the theoretical premise upon which the study has been founded, the 
results give evidence that boards of financial institutions, and more specifically its competence 
level, matters. A performant board, that is free of turbulence and undesired churn, is more apt to 
confront the added complexities of guiding the organisation towards an optimal risk 
configuration—which tolerates and efficiently manages certain levels of non-performing 
loans—leading to maximum returns. Such a competent board can better balance the 
conformance versus performance dyad and practice a more effective ambidextrous agility that 
fine-tunes the board to the specificity of the bank’s dynamic internal and external environment. 
These findings can be seen as contrasting with the dominant theoretical premises of the 
corporate governance literature. Contrary to the purely conformance orientation of a legal or 
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agency theoretical approaches, it is found that a certain leeway is best to optimise corporate 
performance. Nor is the unregulated performance orientation suggested by the stewardship and 
strategic choice governance approaches optimal in the case of financial institutions, when board 
competence is not taken into consideration. Over-conformance with a competent board or an 
exclusively performance-oriented governance with dysfunctional boards may both lead to sub-
optimal financial results. The balanced governance roles between conformance and 
performance, which in many ways has tilted in favour of the latter within the banking industry, 
requires that the moderating character of board competence be recognised. The necessary 
conformance-performance ambidexterity of board governance is more easily attained in the 
presence of performing board directorship. 
In practise, corporate governance and the role of boards are often diminished to 
standardisation and systemisation. In the face of the growing complexity across a multiplicity of 
governance contexts and specificities, we propose that competence within boards could go a 
long way to permit better customisation and fine-tuned governance that better addresses the 
specific situations confronting the corporations being governed. 
 
6. Implications and future research lines 
From an operational and management control perspective, the findings of the study give 
evidence that banks should not prioritise the NPL ratio as the ideal measure of performance. The 
frequent practice of using a low NPL ratio as a proxy for good financial management and 
policy-goal by which the bank management is appraised, may not be in the best interest of the 
bank. Such control incentivises and ‘distorts’ the behaviour of management towards excessive 
levels of risk aversion that may often be suboptimal for the bank. A performant board should be 
able to implement a more adequate quantifiable measure of accountability that better captures 
the intricacies of optimally directing a financial institution’s credit portfolio. A more talented 
board that is able to take a less antagonistic and more collaborative view of its executive is often 
better able to comply with an ambidextrous conformance-performance governance role (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2007). 
Good directorship may suppose a strong conformance orientation in times of external 
turmoil and economic downturn, but this should not persist indefinitely and become the norm. 
Because of the potentially traumatic consequences for the financial institution of overexposure 
to NPL in times of economic turbulence, most bank boards have erred towards conservatism 
and undue safeguard. The results of this study indicate that non-financial managerial control 
systems and measures beyond NPL levels can also be implemented by banking institutions so as 
to reach a better compatibility between the conformance and performance dimensions of bank 
governance. And this has been found to correlate with better performing banking institutions, 
even in the presence of positive NPL ratios. 
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The excessive conformance orientation of the boards of banks is not just suboptimal for the 
financial institution, but it also has its macroeconomic repercussions if it becomes common 
practice throughout the industry. Such behaviours can easily ‘stout’ growth and business 
dynamics in complex economic eco-systems by discouraging the funding of promising (high-
potential high-risk) business projects (Kleinow et al., 2017). The resulting governance of a non-
performing directorship may overly depend on routines and inertia brought about by 
standardised compliance to low NPL ratios where good governance requires a directorship that 
is able to show ambidexterity and a board that can sprightly configure the adequate balance 
between the conformance and performance dimensions of its governance in line with the 
specificities of the context facing the organisation. 
As an extension to the model presented in this paper we introduced a control variable that 
detects whether the types of banking structure may influence the obtained results. The banking 
institutions were grouped according to their ownership structure (private, public or cooperative 
bank structures). The findings showed no significant difference between private, public of 
cooperative bank structures in what regards the relations captured by the model’s hypotheses. 
Therefore, the nature of a bank’s ownership structure does not influence the fact that the 
economic losses that follow high rates of NPL are more severe among financial firms that 
display non-performing directorship. 
As with most empirical studies, a series of limitations apply, which open the door for 
further research opportunities. Because the research methodology used in the study is primarily 
based on a variance analysis of a quantitative nature, we can only speculate based on the 
adopted theoretical premise ‘How’ the dependent and independent variables analysed are truly 
bond. To answer the ‘How’ question would require a process research approach. 
Similarly, we have based our study on the Costa-Rican banking industry, which allowed us 
to capture the full population of banking institutions for the entirety of the thirteen-year period 
under analysis. However, as with any geographically bounded study, greater geographical 
comparative studies are needed. The specificities of the banking system in Costa-Rica, being a 
small and developing market, mean that the results of the study are themselves specific in nature 
and open to further verification in future studies. 
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Table 1. Conformance and Performance roles of Boards 




• Appointing and rewarding 
senior management 
• Overseeing management 
performance 
• Monitoring key performance 
indicators 
• Monitoring key financial and 
budgetary controls 
• Managing risks 
Strategic thinking: 
• Agreeing strategic direction 
• Shaping and agreeing long-term 
plans 
• Reviewing and deciding major 
resource decisions and investments 

























2000 0.0254 0.0207 0.1842 0.1444 0.0398 126,910 0.2683 7.3830 47 
2001 0.0208 0.0237 0.1463 0.0997 0.0467 132,065 0.2550 7.3617 47 
2002 0.0203 0.0262 0.1901 0.1449 0.0452 148,550 0.2524 7.3556 45 
2003 0.0165 0.0239 0.1267 0.1125 0.0136 175,734 0.2295 7.3571 42 
2004 0.0126 0.0252 0.1468 0.1075 0.0393 211,666 0.2177 7.4634 41 
2005 0.0107 0.0254 0.1556 0.1018 0.0538 233,115 0.2001 7.5897 39 
2006 0.0125 0.0224 0.2122 0.1416 0.0706 240,678 0.2039 7.5128 40 
2007 0.0102 0.0213 0.1556 0.1157 0.0399 292,323 0.1867 7.5789 39 
2008 0.0108 0.0230 0.1814 0.1179 0.0635 314,303 0.2141 7.6341 42 
2009 0.0148 0.0178 0.1989 0.1146 0.0843 335,856 0.2131 7.7805 41 
2010 0.0133 0.0167 0.2126 0.1296 0.0830 325,063 0.2128 7.9524 42 
2011 0.0114 0.0164 0.1334 0.0974 0.0361 345,829 0.2101 7.9268 41 
2012 0.0129 0.0151 0.1348 0.1056 0.0292 382,897 0.2069 7.8537 41 







Table 3. Fixed-effects regression results: Board turnover, bad loan ratio and ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







Board turnover (%) 0.0026 (0.0025) 
0.0068** 
(0.0033)   
NPL ratio   
Board turnover (%)   
–0.2326** 
(0.1166)   
Board turnover, 












natural (PD) (%)   
NPL ratio 
   –0.2249 (0.1946) 
Board turnover, 
forced (NPD) (%)   
NPL ratio 
   –0.1815*  (0.1007) 


















Board size (ln 









Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 







F–test 10.18*** 11.13*** 14.67*** 16.65*** 
R2 (within) 0.3219 0.3253 0.3291 0.3317 










Observations 491 491 491 491 
In all models the dependent variable is the ratio of return on assets (ROA). All independent variables are 
lagged one period (t-1) to avoid endogeneity. The variables linked to board turnover are estimated as the 
percentage change between the second semester of period t-1 and the first semester of period t. All model 
specifications include a set of time (T-1) dummies. Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, 














Table 4. Comparison of coefficients (models 2-4 in Table 3) 
 F–test p–value 
Panel A: Model 2 in Table 3   
NPL ratio = NPL ratioBoard turnover (%) 4.05** 0.0494 
   
Panel B: Model 3 in Table 3   
Board turnover, natural (PD) (%) = Board turnover, forced (NPD) (%) 3.53* 0.0659 
   
Panel C: Model 4 in Table 3   
Board turnover, natural (PD) (%) = Board turnover, forced (NPD) (%) 5.59** 0.0220 
Board turnover, natural (PD) (%) =  
Board turnover, natural (PD) (%)NPL ratio 1.41 0.2410 
Board turnover, forced (NPD) (%) =  
Board turnover, forced (NPD) (%)NPL ratio 2.71* 0.0927 































Table A1. Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1) NPL ratio   1       
2) ROA –0.1456   1      
3) Board turnover   0.0322   0.0295   1     
4) Board turnover 
– natural (PD) –0.0396   0.1482   0.7435   1    
5) Board turnover 
– forced (NPD)   0.0964 –0.1376   0.5743 –0.1205   1   
6) Total assets –0.1395 –0.2864 –0.1747 –0.3602   0.1811   1  
7) Capital 
adequacy   0.0899   0.6954   0.1374   0.2717 –0.1286 –0.5805   1 
8) Board size –0.0657   0.1141 –0.0607 –0.0032 –0.0861   0.0203   0.1269 
Correlations between | 0.0860 | and | 0.0965 | are significant at the 5% level, while correlations higher 
than | 0.0965 | are significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
